

The Tax and Economic Impacts of Section 1031 Like-Kind Exchanges in Real Estate

David C. Ling and Milena Petrova
May 2021



We employ several data sources and document the **widespread** use of real estate like-kind exchanges


- Based on CoStar COMPS: the CRE industry most comprehensive database of property sale/purchase transactions
 - Like-kind exchanges represent approximately **6%** of total transactions with a **median price of \$2.1 million and transaction volume of \$241 billion over 2010-06/2020**.
 - **Observed exchange share in CoStar understated**, since CoStar flags a transaction as including a “1031 exchange sale condition” only if this information has been disclosed by one of the parties involved (buyer, seller, or a broker).
- Based on Marcus & Millichap Research Services:
 - **23%** of their apartment, shopping center, office, and industrial property transactions involved a 1031 buyer
 - **39% of net leased** properties involved an exchange
 - Exchanges are **relatively equally distributed among the four major property types**: apartment (22%), office (20%), industrial (21%) and retail (27%)
- Based on July 2020 Survey by the National Association of Realtors (NAR):
 - **12%** of participants’ transactions over the past four years (2016-2019) were part of a 1031 like-kind exchange
- Based on exchange data from the Investment Property Exchange Services, Inc. (IPX1031®), a national leader in 1031 exchange services:
 - During 2010-June 2020 IPX1031® served as a qualified intermediary in **123,359 (131,748) relinquished (replacement) property exchanges**, involving a variety of property types
 - 75 percent of properties involved in a 1031 exchange have a price of less than \$1.5 million
 - Like-kind exchanges include a large number of single family and modest multifamily residential rental properties

→ Based on these sources we conclude that the share of exchanges likely ranges from 10 to 20% of all CRE transactions over the period of 2010-2020

Exchanges are associated with higher investment

- A seller using a 1031 exchange has the incentive to invest the full amount of proceeds from the sale of the relinquished property to acquire the replacement property(s).
- On average replacement exchanges are associated with an increased investment of **\$127,500** or **15.4% of the value** of the relinquished property
- The price difference ($P_{\text{replacement}} - P_{\text{relinquished}}$) is positive in **62% of the like-kind exchanges** and only **45% of the non-tax motivated** transactions.
 - Taxes are not fully deferred in 38 percent of the like-kind exchanges.
- Results are robust over time and by state


Replacement-Relinquished Percentage Price Differences for Exchanges & Ordinary Sales by Year



Exchanges are associated with lower leverage

- Since drawing out some of the sale proceeds from an exchange transaction results in immediate tax liability, the exchange buyer in a replacement acquisition is **more likely to have a larger down payment** compared to a non-tax-motivated buyer
- We examine initial leverage used by investors in like-kind exchanges vs. ordinary sales
 - Unbalanced sample: **initial leverage is 30% in LKEs vs. 43% in ordinary acquisitions**
 - One-on-one (like-kind exchange – sale) matched sample using propensity-score matching:
 - **31% in LKEs vs. 45% in ordinary acquisitions based on means**
 - 24% in LKEs vs. 57% in ordinary acquisitions based on medians
 - LKEs are further associated with **a large number of all-cash transactions**

Lower leverage in exchanges is robust by year and state



Capital expenditures are increased in exchanges

- To the extent that less leverage is used to acquire replacement properties in like-kind exchanges, tax-motivated investors will have higher debt capacity to invest in building improvements
- Our capital expenditure analysis is based on matching Costar data with detailed capital expenditure data from NCREIF
- The results lend some support to the argument that acquisitions of replacement properties to complete a like-kind exchange are associated with higher capital expenditures

→ Capital expenditures associated with 1031 replacement properties are, on average, **higher by \$0.66/sf**
→ **This increased capital investment is driven by significantly higher building improvements**

Holding periods are shorter for investors in exchanges

- To examine the potential “lock-in” effect on existing property owners of the repeal of tax-deferred exchanges, using data from Costar, we compare the holding periods of properties acquired and disposed in ordinary sales to the holding periods of properties disposed in like-kind exchanges

→ We find that exchanges are associated with holding periods that are on average approximately 1/3 to a year shorter

Implications of LKE elimination for market values

- We develop an analytical model to quantify the value of an exchange to the owner, relative to a fully taxable sale and further examine the cost of the program to the Treasury
- **5%** is the average incremental present value of a like-kind exchange as a percent of the price of the relinquished property
 - This incremental tax benefit also captures the extent to which **CRE property prices would have to decline**, or the value of **future after-tax rental income would have to increase**, to fully offset the loss in tax benefits that would be associated with the elimination of exchanges, all else equal
- **37% is the average incremental value of an exchange strategy** as a percent of the deferred tax liability
 - **63 percent** of the value of immediate tax deferral is **eliminated** by **reduced depreciation deductions** in the replacement property and **increased capital gain and depreciation recapture taxes**

Elimination of LKEs could therefore:

- put downward pressure on CRE prices in the short run
- put upward pressure on rents in the longer run
- reduce liquidity/transaction activity (short-run & long run)

Estimated PV of revenue losses from RE like-kind exchanges

	In billions of \$	
	2019	2019-2023
Total present value to all taxpayers of deferred tax liabilities		
Minimum	\$0.8	\$4.2
Average	\$3.9	\$20.1
Maximum	\$6.0	\$30.9

- Even these revenue loss estimates overstate cost of RE LKEs to Treasury as they assume taxpayers would dispose of their properties in fully-taxable sales in the absence of option to exchange
 - But...many would delay disposing of properties if exchanges not available
 - Others might engage in opportunity zones investments, UPREIT transactions or installment sales
- In short, **behavioral responses** by taxpayers would reduce the increase in Treasury revenues implied by a static analysis
- Reduced transaction activity would have **negative spillover effects in industries such as construction, title insurance, & mortgage lending**

Conclusions

- RE like-kind exchanges are widely spread across the US
- The results of the empirical analyses demonstrate that 1031 exchanges are associated with increased investment, reduced leverage (lower risk) and shorter holding periods
- Results of our analytical model and empirical analyses suggest the tax revenue losses of LKEs may be overestimated, while their benefits overlooked
- Elimination of RE LKEs will likely lead to:
 - **Decrease in CRE prices**
 - **Less reinvestment in commercial and residential real estate**
 - **Greater use of leverage, and**
 - **Increase in investment holding periods and decrease in liquidity**